Study of the Privacy Models in RFID Authentication Protocols

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Abstract

Privacy is a major concern in RFID systems, especially with widespread deployment of wireless enabled interconnected personal devices. In this paper, we consider privacy issues in RFID system where the authorized readers must be able to identify tags without an adversary being able to trace them, and provide a formal security model for privacy in RFID system. Under this model, we analyze the recently proposed RFID authentication protocol named anonymous RFID authentication protocol and show attacks on them that compromise the privacy.

Keywords: privacy model; untraceability; RFID

1. Introduction

A passive radio-frequency identification (RFID) tag is a microchip that is capable of transmitting a static identifier or serial number for a short distance. It is typically activated by a query from a nearby reader, which also transmits power for the operation of the tag. Nowadays, RFID is used in a wide variety of applications, from the small plaques mounted on car windshields for the purpose of automated toll payment to the theft-detection tags attached in shops to consumer goods, and the proximity cards used to control physical access to buildings.

Privacy is a significant concern that needs to be addressed in terms of tag anonymity and tag untraceability when RFIDs are to be as widely deployed as conceived by proponents. Tag anonymity requires that the tag ID should be kept anonymous in order to solve the problem of leaking information pertaining to the user belongings. Tag untraceability requires that the output of the tag should not be constant in order to avoid adversary tracking. If the output of the tag is fixed, the adversary can easily track the tag. In addition, in the worst case, i.e., secret information in the tag can be obtained by an adversary due to the tag being not the tamper-resistant hard-ware, forward security is required for preventing an adversary from tracking the past events.

In this paper, we focus on providing a security model for solving the above privacy issues and analyzing the recently proposed RFID authentication protocol named anonymous RFID authentication protocol [1] proposed by Shen et. al., in order to show its vulnerability. Until now, a rigorous treatment of privacy for RFID models is still being developed. It is worth
noting that some famous models have already been proposed by Avoine [2], Juels and Weis [3], Le Burmester and de Medeiros [4], and Vaudenay [5]. These models differ mainly in their treatment of the adversary's ability to corrupt tags. In this paper, our model is based on Juels-Weis model and allows the adversary to corrupt tags to obtain the secret information.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In the following section, some related works are briefly introduced. A security model for privacy is described in detail in Section 3. Security analysis of the anonymous RFID authentication protocol is presented in Section 4. Finally, the conclusions of this paper are covered in Section 5.

2. Related Works

The success of RFID tag implementations depends on addressing privacy and security issues surrounding the use of RFID tags. People always hope that their privacy and security are able to be protected. However, a majority of existing RFID tag implementations are not secure, even though the RFID technology increases the safety of food and drugs through proper monitoring and counterfeit prevention. These tags can broadcast information about their presence so that an adversary can silently track and monitor the presence of an RFID tag from a distance without the knowledge of the person holding the tagged object [6]. Lots of researches focus on designing authentication protocols in RFID-tagged systems to protect the privacy and security of the use of RFID tags. Interested readers can refer to recent survey papers [7] for more details.

Many simple challenge-response protocols have been proposed. The Ohkubo-Suzuki-Kinoshita protocol (OSK) [8] made forward privacy possible. A few attempts have been made to really formalize privacy in RFID protocols. One of the first attempts was made by Avoine [2]. Following their model, privacy is formalized by the ability to distinguish two known tags. Juels and Weis [3] extended this model using side-channel information and making the two target tags chosen by the adversary. Another model was proposed by Burmester and de Medeiros [4]. Our security model is defined based on Juels and Weis model. Recently, Shen et.al proposed an anonymous RFID authentication protocol [1]. However, under the well defined security model below, it is vulnerable to active attacks and violates the privacy requirements.

3. Security Model and Definitions

3.1. Model

Communication between readers and tags is provided via a wireless network, upon which third parties can easily eavesdrop and which is easily cut or disturbed. A protocol party is a \( \mathcal{T} \in \text{Tags} \) or \( \mathcal{R} \in \text{Readers} \) interacting in protocol sessions as per the protocol specifications until the end of the session upon which each party outputs \textit{Accept} if it feels the protocol has been normally executed with the correct parties. Adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) controls the communications between all protocol parties (tag and reader) by interacting with them as defined by the protocol, formally captured by \( \mathcal{A} \)’s ability to issue queries of the following form:

**Execute**\( (\mathcal{R}, \mathcal{T}, i) \) query. This models passive attacks, where adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) gets access to an honest execution of the protocol session \( i \) between \( \mathcal{R} \) and \( \mathcal{T} \) by eavesdropping.
Send\((U_1, U_2, i, m)\) query. This query models active attacks by allowing the adversary \(\mathcal{A}\) to impersonate some reader \(U_1\) in some protocol session \(i\) and send a message \(m\) of its choice to an instance of some tag \(U_2\). It is worth noting that \(U_1\) can also be tag and \(U_2\) can be reader.

Corrupt\((\mathcal{T}, K)\) query. This query allows the adversary \(\mathcal{A}\) to learn the stored secret \(K\) of the tag \(\mathcal{T}\), and which further sets the stored secret to \(K\). It captures the notion of forward security or forward privacy and the extent of the damage caused by the compromise of the tag’s stored secret.

Test\((U, i)\) query. This query is the only query that does not correspond to any of \(\mathcal{A}\)’s abilities or any real-world event. This query allows to define the indistinguishability-based notion of untraceable privacy (UPriv). If the party has accepted and is being asked a Test query, then depending on a randomly chosen bit \(b \in \{0, 1\}\), \(\mathcal{A}\) is given \(\mathcal{T}_b\) from the set \(\{\mathcal{T}_0, \mathcal{T}_1\}\). Informally, \(\mathcal{A}\) succeeds if it can guess the bit \(b\). In order for the notion to be meaningful, a Test session must be fresh, which means the party has not been sent a Corrupt query.

3.2. Privacy Definition

It is worth noting that anonymity can be easily achieved, so we define the untraceability in detail here.

Definition 1 (RFID Untraceable Privacy)

Untraceable privacy (UPriv) is defined using the game \(\mathcal{G}\) played between a malicious adversary \(\mathcal{A}\) and a collection of reader and tag instances. \(\mathcal{A}\) runs the game \(\mathcal{G}\) whose setting is as follows.

Phase 1 (Learning): \(\mathcal{A}\) is able to send any Execute, Send, and Corrupt queries at will.

Phase 2 (Challenge):

1. At some point during \(\mathcal{G}\), \(\mathcal{A}\) will choose a fresh session on which to be tested and send a Test query corresponding to the test session. Note that the test session chosen must be fresh, which means the party has not been sent a Corrupt query. Depending on a randomly chosen bit \(b \in \{0, 1\}\), \(\mathcal{A}\) is given \(\mathcal{T}_b\) from the set \(\{\mathcal{T}_0, \mathcal{T}_1\}\).

2. \(\mathcal{A}\) continues making any Execute, Send, and Corrupt queries at will, subjected to the restrictions that the parties have not been sent Corrupt queries.

Phase 3 (Guess): Eventually, \(\mathcal{A}\) terminates the game simulation and outputs a bit \(b’\), which is its guess of the value of \(b\).

The success of \(\mathcal{A}\) in winning \(\mathcal{G}\) and thus breaking the notion of UPriv is quantified in terms of \(\mathcal{A}\)’s advantage in distinguishing whether \(\mathcal{A}\) received \(\mathcal{T}_0\) or \(\mathcal{T}_1\). It means that \(\mathcal{A}\) correctly guesses the value of \(b\). This is denoted by \(Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{UPriv}(k)\) where \(k\) is the security parameter. We conclude that an RFID authentication protocol with security parameter \(k\) is untraceable private if:

\[
Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{UPriv}(k) = \frac{1}{2} - \Pr[\text{win}] = \frac{1}{2} - \Pr[b' = b] - \frac{1}{2} \leq \frac{1}{poly(k)},
\]

where \(1/poly(k)\) denotes a negligible function, which can also be expressed as \(\varepsilon(k)\).
**Definition 2 (Tag Unforgeability)** Our definition of tag unforgeability (TUF) for the proposed protocol characterizes the ability of adversary $\mathcal{A}_{TUF}$ to clone valid-looking tags in an RFID system. TUF is defined using the game $\mathcal{G}_{TUF}$ played between a malicious adversary $\mathcal{A}_{TUF}$ and a collection of reader and tag instances, in which $\mathcal{A}_{TUF}$ interacts with the reader and with tags for an arbitrary period of time determined by $\mathcal{A}_{TUF}$. $\mathcal{A}_{TUF}$ runs the game $\mathcal{G}_{TUF}$ whose setting is as follows.

**Phase 1 (Learning):** $\mathcal{A}_{TUF}$ is able to send any Execute, Send queries at will.

**Phase 2 (Challenge):** In the challenge phase, the adversary $\mathcal{A}_{TUF}$ has no oracle access to tags. $\mathcal{A}_{TUF}$ outputs a message to query $\mathcal{R}$ until $\mathcal{R}$ yields some output $\gamma$.

- if $\mathcal{R}$ accept then
  output ‘1’;
- else
  output ‘0’;

Then, $\mathcal{A}_{TUF}$ terminates the game simulation.

The goal of $\mathcal{A}_{TUF}$ is to cause $\mathcal{R}$ to accept at least once. The success of $\mathcal{A}_{TUF}$ in winning $\mathcal{G}_{TUF}$ and thus breaking the notion of TUF is quantified in terms of $\mathcal{A}_{TUF}$’s advantage in causing $\mathcal{R}$ to output “$\gamma = 1$”. This is denoted by $\text{Adv}^{TUF}_{\mathcal{A}_{TUF}}(k)$ where $k$ is the security parameter. Hence, our concrete definition of TUF is given as follows:

A protocol in an RFID system with security parameter $k$ is tag unforgeable if:

$$\text{Adv}^{TUF}_{\mathcal{A}_{TUF}}(k) = \Pr[\mathcal{A}_{TUF}^{E.S \ \text{win} \ G_{TUF}}]$$

$$= \Pr[\gamma = 1] \leq \varepsilon(k),$$

where $\varepsilon(k)$ is negligible function of $k$.

**Definition 3 (Reader Unforgeability)** Reader unforgeability (RUF) is defined using the game $\mathcal{G}_{RUF}$ played between a malicious adversary $\mathcal{A}_{RUF}$ and a collection of reader and tag instances, in which $\mathcal{A}_{RUF}$ interacts with the reader and with tags for an arbitrary period of time determined by $\mathcal{A}_{RUF}$. $\mathcal{A}_{RUF}$ runs the game $\mathcal{G}_{RUF}$ whose setting is as follows.

**Phase 1 (Learning):** $\mathcal{A}_{RUF}$ is able to send any Execute, Send queries at will.

**Phase 2 (Challenge):** In the challenge phase, the adversary $\mathcal{A}_{RUF}$ has no oracle access to readers. $\mathcal{A}_{RUF}$ outputs a message to query $\mathcal{T}$ until $\mathcal{T}$ yields some output $\eta$.

- if $\mathcal{T}$ accept then
  output ‘1’;
- else
  output ‘0’;

Then, $\mathcal{A}_{RUF}$ terminates the game simulation.

The goal of $\mathcal{A}_{RUF}$ is to cause $\mathcal{T}$ to accept at least once. The success of $\mathcal{A}_{RUF}$ in winning $\mathcal{G}_{RUF}$ and thus breaking the notion of RUF is quantified in terms of $\mathcal{A}_{RUF}$’s advantage in causing $\mathcal{T}$ to output “$\eta = 1$”. This is denoted by $\text{Adv}^{RUF}_{\mathcal{A}_{RUF}}(k)$ where $k$ is the security parameter. Hence, our concrete definition of RUF is given as follows:

1 A function is negligible if it approaches zero faster than the reciprocal of any polynomial $p(k)$. More formally, $\varepsilon : \{0,1\} \to \{0,1\}$ is negligible if for any nonzero polynomial $p(\cdot)$ there exists an $m$ such that $\forall n > m, |\varepsilon(n)| < 1 / p(n)$. 

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A protocol in an RFID system with security parameter $k$ is reader unforgeable if:

$$
Ad_{A_{RUF}}^R(k) = \Pr[A_{RUF}^{E,S} \overset{w}{\rightarrow} G_{RUF}]
= \Pr[\eta = 1] \leq \varepsilon(k),
$$

where $\varepsilon(k)$ is negligible function of $k$.

**Definition 4 (Forward Security)** Our definition of forward security ($FS$) for the proposed protocol characterizes the ability of adversary $A_{FS}$ to obtain the tag’s previous secret keys when $A_{FS}$ corrupts the tag. $FS$ is defined using the game $G_{FS}$ played between a malicious adversary $A_{FS}$ and a collection of reader and tag instances, in which $A_{FS}$ interacts with the reader and with tags for an arbitrary period of time determined by $A_{FS}$. $A_{FS}$ runs the game $G_{FS}$ whose setting is as follows.

Phase 1 (Learning): $A_{FS}$ is able to send any Execute, Send$^1$, Send$^2$, Send$^3$ and Corrupt queries at will.

Phase 2 (Challenge): $A_{FS}$ starts a new session $i$, during which $A_{FS}$ chooses a fresh tag $T$ to be challenged and sends it a Corrupt query to obtain its secret key $x$. Fresh means that the tag has not been issued any Corrupt query before.

Phase 3 (Guessing): Eventually, $A_{FS}$ terminates the game simulation and outputs $x'(t < i)$, which is its guess of the value of the previous key $x'$ of $T$. Note here that $x' = \text{Update}^{i-t}(x',t,\cdot)^2$.

The goal of $A_{FS}$ is to guess the correct value of $x'$. The success of $A_{FS}$ in winning $G_{FS}$ and thus breaking the notion of $FS$ is quantified in terms of $A_{FS}$’s advantage in guessing the correct value of the previous key $x'$ of $T$. This is denoted by $Adv_{A_{FS}}^F(k)$ where $k$ is the security parameter. Hence, our concrete definition of $FS$ is given as follows:

A protocol in an RFID system with security parameter $k$ is forward secure if:

$$
Adv_{A_{FS}}^F(k) = \Pr[A_{FS}^{E,S,C} \overset{w}{\rightarrow} G_{FS}]
= \Pr[x' = x|x' = \text{Update}^{i-t}(x',t,\cdot)]
\leq \varepsilon(k),
$$

where $\varepsilon(k)$ is negligible function of $k$.


4.1. Review of the Anonymous RFID Authentication Protocol

The anonymous RFID authentication protocol proposed by Shen et.al [1] is depicted in Figure 1. All the used notations are showed in Table 1. Even though the paper [1] provides strong privacy and security with low computation and communication cost, there are still two vulnerabilities under the above security model.

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$^2$Update denotes some key updating function. $\cdot$ denotes some related input of function Update.
Table 1. Notations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ℛ</td>
<td>RFID reader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ℛ_r</td>
<td>Random number generated by RFID reader ℛ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ℋ</td>
<td>RFID tag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ℋ_r</td>
<td>Random number generated by RFID tag ℋ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Static identity of RFID tag ℋ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Pseudonym of RFID tag ℋ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Safeguard of P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ℋ_T</td>
<td>Static identity of RFID tag ℋ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ℋ_T_P</td>
<td>Pseudonym of RFID tag ℋ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ℋ_T_S</td>
<td>Safeguard of ℋ_T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ℋ_T_x</td>
<td>Secret for RFID tag ℋ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ℋ_BS</td>
<td>Back-end server</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h(·)</td>
<td>One-way hash function: {0,1}^* → {0,1}^*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⊕</td>
<td>Exclusive-OR (XOR)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. The Anonymous RFID Authentication Protocol

4.2. Security Analysis

1) Violation of untraceability

Let i be the protocol session. Let us assume that the adversary breaks into the tag’s memory at time i. The adversary sends Corrupt query thus gets \( x_T^i \). It then follows the protocol and waits for the tag memory to get updated to \( x_T^{i+1} \). Note that, the adversary did nothing after getting \( x_T^i \) and allowed the tag to continue and complete the protocol with the server for the session. After the tag memory has been updated to \( i+1 \), the adversary accesses the memory and gets \( x_T^{i+1} \) at session \( i+1 \). Moreover, the adversary has got the protocol transcripts of session \( i \) \( (r_T^i, r_r^i, P^i, M^i, N^i) \) via the public channel. Now, the adversary can compute the following: \( ID = x_T^i \oplus x_T^{i+1} \oplus M^i \). Thus, the ID of the tag is revealed. Next, the adversary has got the protocol transcripts of session \( i-1 \)
\((r^{i-1}_R, r^{i-1}_T, P^{i-1}, M^{i-1}, N^{i-1})\) via the public channel. From this, the adversary can compute: \(x^{i-1}_r = x^i_r \oplus M^{i-1} \oplus ID\). Thus, the forward security is broken. Once the ID is revealed, the tag is no more anonymous and no more resistant to tracking. Thus, the protocol violates the tag untraceability.

2) Violation of de-synchronization

The proposed protocol is not fully resistant to de-synchronization attacks as well. Let us assume that at some point the adversary has blocked the two consecutive \(N^*\) values (\(N^*\) of two consecutive sessions). The server has thus already updated itself, but the tag has not. The tag and the server will remain de-synchronized from then. Let us elaborate the above scenario:

At session \(i\), the tag has \(x^i_T\). The server has \(x^{i-1}_r, x^i_T\). Tag has been authenticated successfully. The server updates its memory to \(x^{i+1}_T\), \(x^{i+1}_r\). The adversary has blocked \(N^*\). So, the tag cannot update its memory. The tag still has \(x^i_T\) in its memory. At session \(i+1\), the tag has \(x^{i+1}_r\). The server has \(x^{i+1}_r, x^{i+1}_T\). Tag has been authenticated successfully using \(x^{i+1}_T\). The server updates its memory to \(x^{i+2}_T, x^{i+2}_r\). The adversary has blocked \(N^{i+1}\). So, the tag cannot update its memory. The tag still has \(x^{i+1}_T\) in its memory. At session \(i+2\), the tag has \(x^{i+2}_T\). The server has \(x^{i+1}_r, x^{i+2}_r\). Hence, tag cannot be authenticated successfully since the server does not have \(x^{i+2}_r\) in its memory anymore. The tag and server get de-synchronized.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we consider privacy issues in RFID system where the authorized readers must be able to identify tags without an adversary being able to trace them, and provide a formal security model for privacy in RFID system. Under this model, we analyze the recently proposed RFID authentication protocol named anonymous RFID authentication protocol and show attacks on them that compromise the privacy. In particular, the attacks like de-synchronization are very difficult to prevent. We can assume that the attacker can only block the transmission only one time to achieve this requirement. In addition, forward privacy is very important to protect the history output. In the future, we want to define a more general model to analyze the RFID authentication protocols with formal security proofs.

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